Purpose -Seeks to examine three empirical studies carried out in Canada, the UK and Europe with comparisons drawn on their approach and findings. Design/methodology/approach -The studies were compared using a framework, developed by the authors, along four central elements and two influencing drivers. Findings -Little measurement consistency or output value was evident. The current focus on isolated studies, carried out at a macro level, is discouraged. Practical implications -Future studies need greater rigour, and consequently might be of more value to academics and practitioners. Originality/value -The lack of research consistency is highlighted. Recommendations are made for stronger adhesion with other disciplines to develop a robust research agenda.
Introduction
The concept of intelligence in general and marketing intelligence (MI) in particular has grown both in academia and the business world. It is not uncommon for this to be seen as a driver of strategy and success in the marketplace (Lackman et al., 2000; Sammon et al., 1984) . Ettorre (1995) aligned the concept of MI to strategic planning by saying "marketing intelligence was about staying one step ahead of the competition by gathering information which could be converted to actionable intelligence and which can then be applied to both short and long term strategic planning".
Past studies have pointed to a high percentage of European firms operating intelligence units (Wright et al., 1999; Badr, 1998 Badr, , 2003 . In an effort to better understand this literature, a comparison is made here between studies of intelligence practices in Canada, the UK and Europe.
The theoretical concept
Defining what competitive intelligence (CI), or, as it is sometimes referred to, business intelligence (BI), actually is causes considerable debate between practitioners and academics.
marketing function, an increasing number are recognising that MI has greater significance at the corporate level (Lackman et al., 2000; Sammon et al., 1984) . Other authors have indicated that sales and marketing intelligence (SMI) may be one of the most important assets within a firm (Rich, 2002; Miree and Prescott, 2000; Powell and Allagier, 1998; Jeppsen, 2005) . Miree and Prescott (2000) were of the view that as SMI typically deals with customers, competitors, products and sales issues, it is difficult to find a better platform from which to base an organization's overall strategic and tactical CI capability.
Looking at practices around the world -a framework for comparison Three detailed academic studies into this area will be compared and examined: Canada (Calof and Breakspear, 1999) , the United Kingdom, (Wright and Pickton, 1998) and Europe (Badr, 2003) . Instead of regarding intelligence as simple data collection, these studies define intelligence as a much broader concept with an accompanying comprehensive process.
In preparing for their study at the time, Calof and Dishman (2002) found three distinct themes in past evaluation instruments:
(1) process and structure -appropriate policies, procedures, and a formal or informal infrastructure to enable employees to contribute effectively to the CI system as well as to gain benefits from the CI process are considered highly desirable; (2) culture, awareness and attitudes -appropriate organizational awareness of CI and a supportive culture is deemed essential if the firms is to utilise its CI efforts successfully; and (3) intelligence project processes -an almost universal adoption of what is commonly referred to as the intelligence cycle or wheel with planning, collection, analysis and communication as the usual elements. Accordingly, to compare academic studies on this topic, the authors have used the observations of Calof and Dishman (2002) and developed a framework within which these dimensions are used to contrast the three studies (see Figure 1 ). The studies were selected because they are amongst the very few conducted by academics which view the intelligence effort as a systematic process as opposed to information collection. They are also rooted more firmly in the intelligence literature than the environmental scanning literature. They also represent early empirical attempts by academics to understand the "intelligence unit" concept. The UK and European studies were the first to be undertaken in those locations, and the Canadian study was preceded only by work from the same authors. All three studies were, at the time, innovative.
Competitive intelligence in Canada
This sample for this large-scale study was taken from industry associations, primarily related to technology (Calof and Breakspeare, 1999) . A population of 3,080 firms was identified. Questionnaires were returned by 1,280, of which 255 were incomplete, thus giving a valid response rate of just over 33 per cent.
Quest for competitive intelligence
Process and structure Only 2.7 per cent had a formal intelligence unit. Further, 70.3 per cent reported that they conducted intelligence on a part-time basis with employees being responsible for their own intelligence. For 5.4 per cent, although there was no designated intelligence unit, appropriate resources were made available for the task.
In examining where the intelligence function lay, 50 per cent said that it resided within marketing, 19 per cent indicated a direct line responsibility to the President, and 17 per cent reported to R&D. This indicated that the Canadian intelligence model is marketing-based, MI-focused and part-time in approach.
Only 26 per cent claimed a capability to locate internal sources of information/knowledge, and very little use was made of computer systems to support CI activities (13 per cent and 8 per cent). Although 49 per cent indicated that they it was easy for employees to report intelligence input, only 13 per cent had incentives to encourage this. Only 11 per cent reported the existence of a formal intelligence system, suggesting a somewhat casual approach to this critical activity.
Culture, awareness and attitude CI was seen by 74 per cent of respondents as being a legitimate and necessary activity, with 76 per cent observing that senior managers gave explicit support. Eighty-nine per cent said that employees understood that sharing information was important to the firm's success. This is indicative of a positive culture, awareness and attitude towards intelligence that might not, as evidenced earlier, be being fully supported by the process and structure.
Planning and focus Seventy-six per cent of respondents recognized that intelligence required much more than just asking questions about competitors. Additionally, 77 per cent felt that their activities were focused on the needs of senior management, but only 23 per cent regularly interviewed executives to truly understand their strategic or decision-making needs. This apparently healthy situation appeared to be inconsistent with reality, as 46 per cent of respondents indicated that they focused only on their direct competitors.
Collection
While 73 per cent of respondents regularly gained information about competitors or emerging technology from their employees, the predominant source of information was reported as secondary/external (88 per cent). Only 61 per cent of respondents maintained a network of in-house experts, while 38 per cent used their scientists and engineers as primary sources of intelligence on competitors' R&D programmes and/or new emerging technologies. Contacts outside the organisation were a primary intelligence source for 44 per cent.
Analysis
Of respondents tracked worldwide, 56 per cent advanced which might affect their core technology/business, and 35 per cent were producing forecasts of substitute or upgrades. A total of 46 per cent developed profiles of emerging technology, and 21 per cent prepared competitor profiles, which included their R&D plans. Although 31 per cent produced assessments that addressed several possible outcomes of competitor action, only 12 per cent reported using basic analytical frameworks such as SWOT and gap analysis.
Communication
Although the communication phase was not a prime area for this study, 54 per cent of respondents indicated that intelligence results were given to anyone in the organization who expressed an interest. Wright et al. (1999) used SCIP (Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals) members as the source for a self-selecting sample. A total of 218 questionnaires were mailed, resulting in 45 usable responses (21 per cent). The industry split was manufacturing 60 per cent/services 40 per cent, with sales reported in excess of £10 million by 89 per cent. More than 75 per cent of respondents worked in the marketing area, with 11 per cent being at director level.
Competitive intelligence in the UK
Process and structure A total of 63 per cent had a dedicated CI unit, established for less than one year with 15 per cent for more than ten years. Only 7 per cent had a lone CI practitioner and 4 per cent had more than ten staff. Most firms subsumed the intelligence role with that of analyst or planner, with just 26 per cent holding a job title which included the word "competitor", "competitive" or "intelligence". Firms with officially named CI practitioners tended to be those with dedicated CI units.
Culture, awareness and attitude Projects were agreed in consultation with senior managers/strategic units in 55 per cent of cases, self-initiated by 21 per cent and developed specifically by senior managers/strategic units by 24 per cent. The lack of CI awareness and understanding, despite growing interest, was seen to be a significant barrier to effectiveness. While Quest for competitive intelligence senior management viewed CI activities as "of good use for the company's situation", "a crucial and integral part of company success" and "a long term investment of increasing importance", others said that their top management saw CI as "a short term fad". Paradoxically, 73 per cent said they received enough support from management, but 22 per cent reported minimal support. This suggests issues of interaction, integration and communication, as well as suggesting that these particular companies may not be CI-friendly.
Other major hurdles mentioned were:
. the need for evidence of the benefits of CI (44 per cent);
.
problems of integration and acceptance by other departments and managers (41 per cent);
. location and responsibility issues (44 per cent); and . lack of experience in CI/scarcity of UK models of CI in action (44 per cent).
Planning and focus
The top reasons for undertaking CI were:
. identify opportunities and threats in the industry;
. track competitors;
. pre-empt competitor activity; and . aid effective strategic decisions.
Only 28 per cent of respondents reported that CI output was always used for strategic purposes, with 44 per cent citing this to be the case often. This suggests that a very valuable CI effort is taking place at the tactical level. Bearing in mind the significant size of some of the firms taking part in this study, it is possible to conclude that the incorporation of CI as part of the normal management process in corporate UK has yet to emerge.
Collection
The least common methods of intelligence gathering were "sending bogus customers into contact with competitors", "watching competitors' premises" and "hiring competitor's staff". The majority of respondents reported that they communicated with customers to gain information. All respondents used material in the public domain, typically websites (96 per cent), industry reports (96 per cent), national newspapers (89 per cent) and trade magazines (87 per cent). While a good starting point, and given the longevity of some of the CI units within the sample, these activities are elementary to say the least and more akin to a library or "clippings service" function. Only 19 per cent felt it was their task alone to pursue intelligence collection. Conversely, and very pleasing, there was evidence of input from non-CI employees in 95 per cent of responses.
Analysis
Commonly used tools of analysis were competitor (73 per cent), forecasting (42 per cent), customer/market (62 per cent), internal (51 per cent) and industry (44 per cent).
Although service companies tended to use intelligence more for tactical decisions (94 per cent) compared to manufacturing companies (85 per cent), such high figures indicate that intelligence analysis need not only be directed at the strategic level. One respondent's view was that "intelligence is choked if only used at a strategic level". For all respondents, new product development was a common tactical intelligence project.
Communication
The most popular dissemination method was the written report (69 per cent). Presentations/meetings were used by 38 per cent, e-mail by 36 per cent, intranets by 20 per cent, face-to-face meetings by 11 per cent and newsletters by 7 per cent. A healthy mix of methods is being employed to suit individual situations and intelligence needs. Computerised databases were the least cited mode of communication. The most common problem faced by respondents was making the information and structure relevant to the audience whilst being brief yet useful (21 per cent).
Competitive intelligence in Europe
The European study was initiated to identify the working relationship between CI and marketing strategy formulation (MSF) (Badr, 2003) . It addressed a significant gap in the existing literature. The SCIP database was again the source for contacts. Of the 806 questionnaires distributed, a usable number of 227 (28 per cent) was received. This was a large-firm study, with 56 per cent of respondents operating with a turnover of over e1 billion and 71 per cent having , 1,000 employees. The dominant industry sector was pharmaceuticals, closely followed by industrial products and chemical companies.
Process and structure A variety of intelligence structures was observed, with 26 per cent indicating a small number of CI practitioners and 18 per cent one full-time person. Of those, 23 per cent had a separate CI department but only 8 per cent felt that the intelligence function was fully integrated throughout the organization. Intelligence and CI was seen to be part of the strategic planning department in 7 per cent of cases, closely followed by the marketing department (4 per cent), and then IT (1 per cent).
Culture, awareness and attitude
The majority of respondents (80 per cent) indicated that senior management felt that CI was an essential input to strategic decision making, while 78 per cent indicated it was an essential component of marketing strategy formulation. Interestingly, 69 per cent indicated that CI was worth the effort and 67 per cent also thought that CI was an "above board and legal activity".
Planning and focus
Given that the study focus was on the role which CI played in the MSF process, responses were quite specific, and consequently not always directly comparable with the Canadian and/or UK studies. They are, nevertheless, relevant. On enquiring about the various steps in the MSF process, 77 per cent recognised a contribution being made to the setting of marketing objectives and also strategic decision-making, with 68 per cent identifying implementation and control. Respondents felt that CI helped them to better understand their competitors' strategy and objectives. Sixty per cent viewed CI as a way to ensure that objectives were developed within a realistic and achievable perspective.
Quest for competitive intelligence
The key reasons for using CI were reported as: to improve awareness and deal with competitor activities (97 per cent), and to assess the changing market/industry structure (74 per cent), emerging technology (60 per cent), regulatory climate (50 per cent), customer or supplier activity (49 per cent), global economic conditions (46 per cent) and the political climate (37 per cent).
Collection
Collection methods were databases/newspapers (67 per cent), business periodicals (65 per cent), trade shows/conferences (64 per cent) and internal/sales reports (47 per cent). Respondents also cited the sources they rarely used: debriefing of new staff previously working for competitors (13 per cent), trade shows/conferences (11 per cent), agencies (11 per cent), and books (10 per cent). In the central section for frequency of use were customers, government publications, professional associations, academically authored periodicals/journals, consultants, bankers/lawyers, suppliers/distributors and social networks. This supports previous findings, suggesting that little adventure or imagination is taking place during intelligence collection.
Analysis
The commonly used tools and templates of analysis were competitors (82 per cent) SWOT (76 per cent), KSF (64 per cent) and financial (60 per cent). Win/lose analysis was hardly ever used by 78 per cent of respondents, with STEP analysis a close second at 74 per cent. Probably the most advanced tool for analysing intelligence, war gaming/role playing, was never/rarely/sometimes used by 83 per cent of respondents. With competitor profiling at one end of the analysis spectrum and war gaming/role playing at the other, one might have cause to question the efficiency and efficacy of the former without a timely intervention of the latter. This situation is exacerbated when recalling the statements made regarding the strategic contribution expected from the planning and focus stage.
Communication
The most popular methods were databases (75 per cent) and a secure intranet (72 per cent), while a dedicated intelligence system was unpopular with 69 per cent. Group decision support systems were equally disregarded by 86 per cent of respondents. The most popular methods were fax/e-mail (47 per cent) and individual presentation (36 per cent).
Comparing the studies
The studies provide a good insight into intelligence practices in different locations. Additionally, an examination of each reveals a rich literature that has been drawn upon. However, there are significant differences and similarities within:
. Process and structure -The Canadian study indicated that while there was evidence of significant intelligence activity, only 2.7 per cent had formal CI units. Compare this to 69 per cent found in the UK study and 23 per cent in the European study.
. Culture, awareness and attitude -The Canadian study revealed a strong culture for information sharing and mutual support. Findings from the UK suggested that whilst some support was evident, this was not widespread. Planning and focus -The European study had several areas of focus with competitors dominating. The Canadian study indicated that the focus was broad, covering competitors, customers, regulators, and so forth.
. Collection -All three studies found that secondary sources dominated.
. Analysis -Very little analysis was evident in the Canadian study while both the UK and European studies noted a high percentage of firms using appropriate analytical techniques.
. Communication -Written reports dominated in the UK study. The Canadian study focused more on who received the intelligence results rather than how it was disseminated.
The above raises an important question. Do the studies reflect cultural differences in intelligence practices? Possibly, but this level of comparison and generalisation is not possible owing to significant differences in study design. The European and UK studies focused more on larger firms, while the Canadian study had a significant number of small firms responding. Further, the Canadian study focused exclusively on technology firms while the other two studies were broader. Different approaches were evident also in the questions asked and questionnaire design. In short, the research methodology of the three studies was very different. This is summarised in Table I. The questionnaires themselves were extremely different. The Canadian study used dichotomous variables, while the UK and European studies used a mix of Likert, true/false, and category choices. The questions themselves were also different. Although all three attempted to measure the total intelligence process, each had a greater or lesser focus on individual components. Different measures, different foci, different sample frames and different questions, yet each study attempted to measure the same thing.
One of the similarities between the Canadian and European study was that they both tested the constructs for reliability and validity. Both these studies had Cronbach alphas over 0.75 and predominantly one-dimensional constructs.
There have been many other studies that have examined intelligence at the country level. For example, Viviers and Muller (2004) looked at South Africa; Bensoussan and Densham (2004) looked at practices in Australia; Hedin (2004) examined practices in Sweden; Hirvensalo (2004) examined practices in Finland; Kwangsoo and Seungjin (2004) examined practices in Korea; Hawkins (2004) examined practices in Australia; Michaeli (2004) examined practices in Germany; Tena and Comai (2004) examined practices in Spain; Belkine (2004) examined practices in Israel; Calof and Brouard (2004) Quest for competitive intelligence UK. Few have compared different countries, perhaps precisely because they have all been conducted in a different manner with a different sample frame. Some have been by academics, others by consultants and a few by practitioners so measurement problems are also evident. Additionally, the focus of these studies has typically been on whether companies conducted intelligence activities at all, rather than how these activities were carried out. As a consequence, the output has been interesting in a narrative sense, but less than informative in developing intelligence practices.
The future While the academic literature is turning out quantity, there is little consistency in terms of measurement and output value. In addressing the critical area of intelligence, there has to be some agreement within the field on how to operationalise the intelligence construct. While the definition is generally accepted, measurement is not. Given the holistic and integrative nature of intelligence, researchers should draw upon already accepted measures within the planning, marketing, knowledge management, information systems, organizational design, analysis, and organizational behaviour fields to name but a few. Future research instruments need reliability and validity testing to establish construct strength. To date, few studies have demonstrated this.
Further study objectives should address the issue of scope. It is suggested that the intelligence wheel or cycle is too broad to adequately measure in one study. This paper has identified four different processes within intelligence: planning/focus, collection, analysis and communication, with process/structure and culture/awareness/attitude being undeniable influencers of success. Attempting to measure all of these in one study inevitably conspires to produce a dilution in the quality and richness of response data.
It is time to focus studies on isolated parts of the intelligence model set out in Figure 1 and to attempt to fully understand how each of these elements really work in practice. Replicated country-or industry-specific studies are of little value as these are, by default or design, always conducted at the macro level. No firm worth its salt is going to open its intelligence practice doors to intermittent investigation, so relationship building, new approaches which will get behind the reality of intelligence practice have to be found to advance the knowledge currently residing in the field. This will be to the benefit of both practitioners and academics.
Finally, the instruments used to date have been largely based on assumptions of how intelligence ought to be practised when in truth we need real-life case studies of how it is practised. Rigorously conducted case research can help us better understand exactly what intelligence units do and whether or not their activity fits with what we are teaching. Such projects are already in design by leading CI academics and have been welcomed by practitioners as a "refreshing and useful" approach which will advance knowledge within the field. As part of this new approach, the authors of this article strongly advocate such a sea change in the CI research agenda. Only then will practitioners and academics really be able to demonstrate the benefit of an intelligence programme.
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